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Abstract 
Natech refers to a conjoint natural and technological ha-
zard or accident. This paper is concerned with Natechs 
involving hazards arising from the handling, processing 
and/or storage of hazardous materials, as well as the trans-
portation of oil and gas by pipeline. Risk management of 
chemical accident hazards has generally been carried out 
using industrial risk management regulations and practi-
ces, engineering safety codes and standards, environmen-
tal regulations, and land use planning. However, there is 
evidence that existing regulations and practices may not 
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Natechs have not been factored in. Awareness of the need 
to better address Natech risk has been on the rise; never-
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gulations of individual countries, and a general framework 
for the governance of Natech risk is lacking. This paper 
provides an overview of Natechs, their characteristics, and 
the problems associated with Natech risk management. 
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les y los peligros o accidentes industriales. Este documento 
se ocupa de Natechs que involucran peligros derivados de 
la manipulación, procesamiento y/o almacenamiento de 
materiales peligrosos, así como del transporte del petróleo 
y el gas por oleoductos o gasoductos, respectivamente. En 
general la gestión de riesgos de accidentes químicos se ha 
hecho a través de normas y prácticas de gestión de riesgos 
industriales, códigos de ingeniería y estándares de seguri-
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la tierra. Sin embargo, hay evidencia que la existencia de 
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en cuenta. La conciencia de abordar mejor el riesgo Na-
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en general hay una ausencia de un marco general para la 
gobernanza del riesgo Natech. Este artículo propone una 
visión general de los riegos Natech, sus características y 
los problemas asociados con su manejo.  
Introduction
Natural disasters can trigger secondary 
disasters such as chemical accidents in 
the form of toxic air releases, spillage of 
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sions. These secondary technological 
accidents triggered by natural disasters 
are known as “Natechs”. 
Some prominent examples of Natech 
accidents include:
•  More than 200 hazardous materials 
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trial facilities and over 400 oil and 
gas releases from offshore platforms 
with harmful impacts on the surroun-
ding communities and the environ-
ment triggered by Hurricanes Katrina 
and Rita in the United States (US)’ 
Gulf Coast in 2005 [9]; [28]. The oil 
spills and chemical releases required 
the activation of a special spill clea-
nup task force, resulted in huge losses 
to the oil and gas industry, triggered 
shortages of much needed fuel for 
emergency response and cleanup ac-
tivities, and had economic repercus-
sions in the United States and abroad 
[8-9]. Furthermore, the oil spills 
affected more than 1800 homes and 
resulted in a class action settlement 
for US $330 million. 
•  The Great East Japan earthquake of 
magnitude Mw 9.0 on 11 March 2011 
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and the tsunami it triggered— resul-
ted in hundreds of chemical releases 
and oils spills, including several lar-
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ba and Sendai. In one case, the ear-
thquake forces resulted in multiple 
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gas (LPG) storage tanks, triggered 
domino chemical accidents at neigh-
boring industrial plants, and caused 
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residential buildings, roads and vehi-
cles. The economic losses to industry 
due to property and production capa-
city losses were huge and have had 
repercussions worldwide through 
supply chain effects [19].
•  The Great East Japan earthquake 
and tsunami also triggered the worst 
nuclear power accident in Japan’s 
history. The Dai-ichi nuclear power 
plant (NPP) in Fukushima was inun-
dated by a 15 m tsunami wave, which 
caused loss of power leading to dis-
ruption of controls and the power 
plant’s cooling system shortly after 
the earthquake. Radionuclide conta-
minants were released into the air and 
water due to venting of gases, hydro-
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fuel pond in one of the plant’s units 
[4] The social and economic impacts 
of the Fukushima disaster have been 
huge, with policy repercussions con-
cerning nuclear energy production 
affecting the whole world.
Globalization and interconnected in-
frastructure, both soft and hard, mean 
that disaster impacts on industry in one 
part of the world can result in impacts 
in other areas through the supply chain. 
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in damage and losses worth more than 
US$ 45.7 billion [34]; most of these 
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dustrial manufacturing areas [24]. The 
disruption of the manufacturing supply 
chains affected many industrial sectors 
and caused global shortages of some 
computer parts [14], [24].
Natech accidents can exacerbate the 
impacts of natural disasters and vice-
versa. The Natech accidents triggered 
by the Great East Japan earthquake 
and tsunami have represented an enor-
mous additional social, environmental 
and economic burden on the people 
of Japan and the world. Damage to 
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panies resulted in fuel shortages at a 
time when fuel was most needed not 
only for emergency response and relief 
efforts, but also to compensate for the 
energy shortage caused by the nuclear 
accident.
The nuclear accident alone has had 
tremendous impacts on risk governan-
ce of the nuclear power industry in Ja-
pan. One of the main outcomes of the 
disaster has been a decision to set up 
a new independent nuclear regulatory 
agency under the Environmental Mi-
nistry. The agency will be responsible 
for regulating nuclear power genera-
tion, and it will be separate from the 
previous agency that was in charge of 
promoting it. The Fukushima disaster 
has also resulted in comprehensive sa-
fety reviews, which have led to regu-
latory changes that may slow or even 
eliminate plans for expansions of and 
investments in nuclear power in many 
countries. The most drastic public po-
licy changes due to the strong public 
reactions have occurred in Japan, Ger-
many, Italy, and Switzerland [35].
Although awareness of the need to 
better address Natech risk has been 
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the laws and regulations of individual 
countries, and a general framework for 
the governance of Natech risk is lac-
king. This paper provides an overview 
of Natechs, their characteristics, and 
the problems associated with Natech 
risk management. The paper highlights 
some Natech risk reduction initiatives 
undertaken by individual countries, as 
well as gaps in governance of Natech 
risks. A call for a comprehensive analy-
sis approach to the risk management of 
Natechs is called for as well as the need 
to address Natech risks as a territorial 
risk governance issue.
General background
Natechs can occur in areas where 
there is overlapping of natural, envi-
ronmental and technological hazards. 
Unfortunately, rapid urbanization and 
industrialization in areas subject to 
natural hazards have resulted in more 
people and property being at risk from 
potential Natech accidents. Of particu-
lar concern are low-lying coastal areas, 
and areas that are likely to experience 
more frequent extreme weather events 
[33],[25]. Some of these areas are al-
ready home to densely populated cities 
as well as some of the largest chemical 
and petrochemical industrial areas in 
the world [10]. To illustrate this, higher 
incidence of Natechs have been repor-
ted in the states of Louisiana, Texas, and 
California in the United States, which 
are densely populated, heavily indus-
trialized and subject to earthquake, hu-
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Frequency of Natechs 
Natech accidents have occurred in both 
wealthy and less wealthy countries 
[21]; [37]; [1-2]; [30]; [12]; [31,27]; 
[20]. Most research indicates that the 
frequency of Natechs is increasing. 
Meteorological Related Natechs
Recently, [29] found an increase of eight 
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ber of weather- and storm-related haz-
mat releases, respectively, reported to 
the United States (US) Federal National 
Response Center (NRC) between 1990 
and 2008; events due to tornadoes had 

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per year. Weather related Natechs in 
the US accounted for over 80 % of all 
Natech accidents reported to the NRC. 
Similar results were reported by Ras-
mussen (1995), who studied data from 
US and European accident databases. He 
reported between 1 – 5 % of hazmat re-
leases were caused by natural events, 80 
per cent of these were weather related.
Conditional probabilities of Natechs 
at industrial plants regulated by various 
US Federal regulatory requirements 
have been estimated [28]. In [28] found 
that during hurricanes, a higher proba-
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bility of releases was observed due to 
storm surge compared to category 1–2 
hurricane and areas inundated during 
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releases per 100 facilities.  Nonethe-
less, the authors found widely varying 
Natech occurrence during individual 
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increased urbanization, particularly in 
coastal areas, may result in a higher 
frequency of extreme weather events 
with an accompanying increase in the 
number of Natechs.
Earthquake and Tsunami  
Related Natechs
Natech accidents have been documen-
ted during major earthquakes (magni-
tude 7.0 and higher) affecting urbani-
zed areas: Kocaeli Earthquake, Turkey, 
1999[12]; Gujarat earthquake in India 
in 2001 [37] Great Indian Ocean ear-
thquake and tsunami 2004 [32] Wen-
chuan earthquake in China in 2008 
[20], and the Great East Japan Ear-
thquake and tsunami in 2011 [19] serve 
as examples. 
Estimating the likelihood of Natech 
accidents during earthquakes has been 
an important research topic. [21] found 
that hazmat releases during the Nor-
thridge earthquake in Los Angeles Cou-
nty in 1994 had likely occurred from 
19% of the industrial facilities in the 
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Index (MMI) values were VIII -IX). [28] 
found that the probability of Natechs at 
industrial facilities during earthquakes 
increased from 0.1 releases per 100 fa-
cilities at MMI V to 21.4 releases per 
100 facilities at MMI IX. [12] reported 
that hazmat releases during the Kocaeli 
earthquake of 1999, occurred in 8% of 
the industrial facilities that handle ha-
zardous chemicals. Furthermore, [12] 
found that larger industrial plants, as 
well as older facilities that handle haz-
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
	 
` 
suffer damage and result in hazmat re-
leases during the Kocaeli earthquake.
There is limited or no data on the inci-
dence of Natechs during tsunami. This 
is an area that requires more research.
Factors Contributing to Natechs
Overall, the likelihood of experiencing 
a Natech accident will not only depend 
on the type of natural hazard trigger 
and its magnitude or severity, but also 
on other factors including the extent of 
exposure, the type of chemical, quan-
tity, type of storage tank and storage 
conditions (pressure and temperature), 
structural integrity of the vessel contai-
ning the material, its design, age, main-
tenance schemes, safety management 
culture, proximity to other structures, 
etc. Atmospheric storage tanks, pres-
surized tanks and pipelines have been 
affected most often during past ear-
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As compared to other types of indus-
trial accidents, Natechs present the fo-
llowing characteristics [31]: a) multiple 
releases may occur simultaneously; b) 
safety and mitigation measures may not 
work properly due to the natural event; 
c) emergency response personnel and 
resources may not be available as they 
may be attending to the victims of the 
natural disaster; d) emergency response 
to the chemical release may be hampe-
red  by the natural disaster, or the natural 
disaster may exacerbate its effects, and; 
e) recovery from the hazmat release 
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from the natural disaster or, vice-versa, 
recovery from the natural disaster may 
be slowed by the hazmat release.
The likelihood of multiple simulta-
neous chemical accidents from one or 
more sources may be higher during a 
natural disaster. The natural hazard for-
ces can impact large areas and similar 
structures simultaneously often causing 
common-cause failures [30]; [13]; [31] 
such as elephant foot buckling, liquid 
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few examples. Using probabilistic risk 
assessment, [3] found that individual 
risk increased by an order of magnitu-
de for accidental scenarios triggered by 
earthquakes as compared to accidental 
scenarios triggered by internal system 
failures. The authors found similar 
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Natural disasters generally impact 
large areas, thus many industrial faci-
lities may be affected simultaneously 
resulting in a high number of hazmat 
releases which may overwhelm emer-
gency response personnel. Furthermo-
re, mitigation measures may not work 
properly as the natural disaster may 
have damaged them or they may be ino-
perable due to loss of plant utilities, or 
damage to critical equipment. The pos-
sibility of cascading events also exists, 
as mitigation measures fail and one re-
lease triggers another. The liquid petro-
leum gas (LPG$`

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Earthquake serve as an example. Fire 
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other LPG tanks lead to the explosion of 
other tanks in a chain of events that des-
troyed all 17 LPG`W
Response personnel, equipment and 
emergency materials such as water and 
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lable due to damage caused by the na-
tural disaster, or because the disaster 
has overwhelmed response capacity. 
In addition to the possible need to res-
pond to a large number of simultaneous 
releases, response personnel and their 
equipment may be called to respond 
to the problems caused by the natural 
disaster, especially search and rescue 
operations of natural disaster victims. 
Other personnel may be unavailable 
as they may wish to stay close to their 
families, or because they themselves 
have been hurt. 
The natural disaster may hinder res-
ponse to the chemical release and/ or 
exacerbate its effects. Transportation 
routes may be blocked or impassable 
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prevent responders from reaching the 
release site, or areas where response 
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People may be trapped in buildings 
or in other areas from which they can-
not escape, subjecting themselves to 
the effects of the released chemicals. 
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to ‘‘shelter-in place,’’ and the need to 
evacuate (Steinberg et al. 2008). Reco-
very from the Natech accident may be 
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the natural disaster, and vice-versa, re-
covery from the natural disaster may be 
hampered due to contamination or po-
llution from the release [31].
The particular conditions of Natech 
accidents require special consideration 
in terms of risk governance. Natech 
risk governance should involve many 
players and stakeholders including the 
industrial facility owners/ operators 
and its contractors, suppliers, etc., but 
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ponders, neighboring industrial facili-
ties, and residents, among others.
Natech Risk Management
Industrial risk management generally 
calls for a risk assessment including 
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of certain regulated processes in order 
to quantify the probability of occu-
rrence and the expected consequences 
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program including adoption of safety 
and mitigation measures; and an emer-
gency response program which should 
include emergency response procedu-
res and training. 
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will require a detailed analysis of the 
natural hazard (frequency and seve-
rity), potential impacts of the natural 
events on vulnerable target equipment 
(probability of failure and damage sta-
te given the natural hazard), as well as 
the analysis of the consequences of any 
chemical accident given the natural ha-
zard event context [5]; [18].
A few countries have provisions that 
address Natechs in their chemical ac-
cident prevention rules. Some exam-
ples include the California Accidental 
Release Prevention (CalARP) program 
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a risk assessment of potential releases 
due to an earthquake [30]; and the Law 
on the Prevention of Disasters in Petro-
leum Industrial Complexes and Other 
Petroleum Facilities (PDPC) amended 
after the Tokaichi-oki earthquake in 
Hokkaido, Japan in September 2003, 

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In the European Union, the Seveso II 
Directive requires industrial establish-
ments to consider external hazards in 
the hazard analysis, but does not spe-
cify methodologies or actions that can 
be taken to achieve these requirements 
leading to unequal levels of prepared-
ness among countries [13];[17]. Fur-
thermore, there are still limited risk as-
sessment methods and tools for Natech 
risk evaluation, and only limited gui-
dance is available on what industry and 
government authorities can do to assess 
Natech risk.
Risk management for Natechs should 
not only include a risk assessment of 
potential impacts of natural hazards to 
an industrial facility, but should also 
consider the potential impacts of the 
natural hazard forces on neighboring 
industrial plants and other infrastructu-
re in a territory such as utilities, roads, 
etc., and nearby communities. Based 
on this comprehensive risk assessment, 
risk-reduction alternatives should be 
evaluated and adopted not only for the 
industrial facility, but also for the in-
dustrial zone or territory at risk, which 
in many cases includes residential areas 
and other infrastructure.
In most countries industrial risk 
management practices for chemical 
accident prevention fall short when it 
comes to the application of a more com-
prehensive risk assessment [13]; [11]; 
[17]; [18] particularly because most re-
gulations do not require the analysis of 
Natech risk in a territory. Most risk ma-
nagement rules and regulations around 
the world concern individual facilities, 
with the exception of Japan, which en-
forces the PDPC rule described above. 
There is growing awareness of Na-
tech issues. Several countries are ta-
king a second look at their risk mana-
gement practices to include Natechs. 
France recently passed a new regu-
lation (Decrees 210-1254 and 2010-
1255, dated October 22nd 2010), 
which introduced a new zoning for 
seismic activity. According to the new 
regulation, industrial establishments 
may be considered under “normal 
risk” or “special risk”. “Special risk” 
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in low and upper-tier Seveso establis-
hments that may lead, in case of an 
earthquake, to one or more dangerous 
phenomena with lethal offsite conse-
quences (Ministerial Order, 24 January 
2011) [39]. In Germany, concern over 
a possible increase of hazards by pre-
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change, has lead the German Federal 
Ministry for the Environment, Natu-
re Conservation and Nuclear Safety 
to pass the new Technical Rule for 
Plant Safety 310 in 2012. This Tech-
nical Rule requires industrial establis-
hments with major chemical accident 
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
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-
ggered accidents at their installations, 
including the consideration of poten-
tial impacts due to climate change, and 
requires establishments to take neces-
sary risk reduction measures. 
In Japan, concerns about a power-
ful earthquake (magnitude > 8.0) 
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with a 95% probability in the next 50 
years along the Tokai, To-nankai, and 
Nankai regions, has resulted in the 
passing of the Large-Scale Earthquake 
Countermeasures Special (LSECS) 
Act. This Act has prompted national, 
regional, and local governments in 
these potentially affected areas to take 
special disaster-prevention measu-
res. The LSECS Act has also resulted 
in amendments to the Japanese High 
Pressure Gas Safety (HPGS) Law spe-
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hments to take any additional mea-
sures necessary to reduce the risk of 
accidents, to protect its workers and 
the public from any accidental relea-
ses caused by severe ground motion 
or earthquake triggered tsunami (High 
Pressure Gas Safety Law). In addition, 
Japan uses performance-based buil-
ding codes, so buildings and structu-
res must satisfy performance criteria 
(e.g., remain operational) with regards 
to materials, equipment, and structural 
methods (Japan External Trade Orga-
nization 2005). For example, hazar-
dous industrial establishments will be 
subject to strict building design codes 
that would permit withstanding the 1 
in 800–1500 year event, depending on 
particular fault characteristics, distan-
ce to the fault, soil type, etc, [36] The 
relatively low damage to buildings 
and industry due to the 9.0 magnitu-
de Great East Japan earthquake pays 
tribute to the effectiveness of Japan’s 
earthquake mitigation efforts [23].
Risk management for Natechs still 
poses many challenges including lack 
of data on past accidents and lessons 
learned; limited availability of indus-
trial equipment vulnerability relation-
ships for natural hazards—only some 
data exists for earthquakes and limited 
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trial personnel and engineers, and go-
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practices designed for day-to-day che-
mical accident prevention, which they 
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against natural events.
Risk Reduction Measures
The risk to people, property and the 
environment from chemical accidents 
triggered by natural disasters can be 
reduced through both structural and 
non-structural risk reduction measu-
res. These prevention and mitigation 
measures to reduce the risk of chemical 
accidents triggered by natural hazards 
will vary depending on the type of na-
tural hazards present in a territory and 
their potential magnitude or severity 
and frequency. Generally, these may 
include natural hazard design codes 
and standards, protective infrastructure 
(e.g., break walls, levees), combined 
natural hazard and chemical process sa-
feguards, land-use planning that takes 
into account natural hazards in the te-
rritory, adequate safety management 
systems and trained personnel aware of 
the additional burden a natural disaster 
may pose, natural hazard warning sys-
tems, disaster mitigation and response 
planning, and contingency planning for 
recovery and reconstruction that has 
carefully considered the possible natu-
ral hazard scenarios and its impacts to 
the facility, neighboring facilities, life-
line infrastructure and community.
Emergency Response for Natechs
Natech accidents will require special 
planning in terms of emergency ma-
nagement because the natural disaster 
may impact large areas triggering mul-
tiple, simultaneous chemical accidents, 
and may impact safety and mitigation 
measures and emergency response 
capacity to deal with the Natech acci-
dents. Furthermore, a natural disaster 
can contribute to the escalation of a 
chemical accident, often resulting in 
more severe consequences and compli-
cating emergency response [30]; [3]. 
Industrial emergency response plans 
are generally developed for single ac-
cidents that might occur during normal 
day-to-day plant operation. Thus, emer-
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
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addition, safety and mitigation measu-
res may not be available due to impacts 
from the natural disaster, and standard 
emergency operation procedures may 
be inadequate under the natural disas-
ter conditions. Furthermore, external 
	#WW
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departments) may be unavailable as 
they may be busy attending to natural 
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Natech accidents may hamper emer-
gency response to the natural disaster 
victims, or may even make the situation 
worse. Following the Wenchuan ear-
thquake, one ammonia release resulted 
in the evacuation of 6000 earthquake 
victims, and  another ammonia release 
was believed to have affected survivors 
of the earthquake—some still trap-
ped under the debris in a village—ki-
lling some of them [20].Evacuation of 
search and rescue teams and remaining 
residents following the Kocaeli ear-
thquake in Turkey due to an acrylonitri-
le release resulted in the abandonment 
of earthquake survivors still trapped in 
damaged buildings [30].
There is a need for careful considera-
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ment objectives during a Natech acci-
dent. The examples above highlight the 
importance of careful evaluation and 
planning to prepare for and respond to 
threats involving the impact of natural 
hazards on chemical industry, particu-
larly if these are located in industriali-
zed, urbanized areas that can result in 
potentially high death tolls, damage to 
property and environmental pollution. 
Because natural hazards may impact 
large areas, thus exposing a high num-
ber of facilities and communities, the 
need to address Natech risk reduction 
as a territorial risk governance issue is 
of utmost importance. Natech risk re-
duction cannot be tackled as a problem 
of an individual facility, but through a 
comprehensive and integrated risk go-
vernance approach.
Natech Risk Governance
Natech risk governance requires a com-
prehensive analysis approach. As the 
area impacted by a natural disaster is 
often large, e.g., the area impacted by 

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hundreds of square kilometers, affec-
ting everything in its path. The natural 
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disaster can cause major disruptions 
not only to industrial areas, but also to 
other infrastructure (e.g., electric power 
stations and power transmission lines, 
communications, transportation, emer-
gency services). The interdependencies 
of industrial and other infrastructure 
systems can lead to cascading events 
which may cross regional, national and 
international boundaries [10]. The huge 


	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
earthquake in 2011, hurricanes Katri-
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
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
Thailand in 2011 have pointed out the 
need to better understand infrastructure 
failure interdependencies and their so-
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need to incorporate both parameters of 
the physical environment such as life-
lines, industrial facilities and building 
stock as well as organizational, social 
and systemic factors into the analysis 
of natural hazard risk.
The growing body of research and 
lessons learned from past Natech acci-
dents indicate that they require special 
attention in terms of risk governance. 
Natech risk will involve bringing to the 
table many players and stakeholders 
including the industrial facility owners/ 
operators and its contractors, suppliers, 
	W   X 	
 
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charge of chemical accident prevention, 
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
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facilities, and residents, among others. 
Risk governance provides an excellent 
`   
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sessment, management and communi-
cation of Natech risks in a territory.
Risk governance for the prevention 
of major chemical accidents has gene-
rally been delegated to one agency or 
a couple of agencies in charge of wor-
ker safety, hygiene and security, and 
another (or the same) in charge of envi-
ronmental issues. The risk from natural 
hazards has generally been the respon-
sibility of civil protection authorities 
 	
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
departments. However, in most cases, 
government agencies in charge of na-
tural disaster prevention, preparedness 
and response generally work separa-
tely from those in charge of chemical 
accident prevention resulting in gaps in 
terms of risk governance. 
}
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of Natechs, the various steps—as-
sessment, prevention, preparedness 
and response, and recovery and recons-
truction—to reduce their risks require 
special governance arrangements, and 
coordination and planning to insure that 
all possible hazards and consequences 


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addressed, and the vulnerability mini-
mized. Thus, only by bringing all pla-
yers and stakeholders together, can the 
full picture of possible interactions and 
failure modes be anticipated, and their 
impacts reduced or mitigated. 
As mentioned above, the governance 
of Natech risks requires bringing to-
gether industry owners/operators, pro-
fessionals from differing backgrounds 
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cialists, hydrologists, meteorologists, 
earthquake engineers, industrial equi-
 	 	W 	

from government agencies in charge 
of industrial risk management, public 
health and environmental pollution 
control, regional and city planners, 
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ponders, and policy-makers as well as 
potentially affected communities [7]. 
The protection of hazardous industrial 
facilities, their associated systems and 
neighboring communities and infras-
tructure, requires that they be analy-
zed not as independent entities, but 
as a part of a much larger, connected 
system. Disaster consequences may be 
greatly reduced with a collective effort 
to understand and prevent ripple effects 
from Natech type failures [10]. Redu-
cing Natech risk should be a collective 
decision making process.
Conclusions
Current practices for industrial risk 
management have worked quite well, 
particularly in wealthier countries. 
Nevertheless, the Great East Japan 
earthquake and tsunami, among other 
examples above, show that there have 
been failures even in the rich world. 
These recent events point to the need 
for a more careful assessment of poten-
tial impacts of natural hazards on ha-
zardous facilities. They also show that 
the potential impacts of Natechs may 
be widespread and could exacerbate the 
natural disaster. The human and econo-

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of Natech accidents can be very high.
Major accidents may have real and 
profound impacts on risk perception 
and tolerability, and in the past have of-
ten forced authorities to make changes 
to regulations. These changes often re-
sult in additional technical and econo-
mic burden to industry. The Fukushima 
nuclear power accident is an extreme 
case of a Natech with major social, en-
vironmental and economic impacts for 
Japan and the world.
In the face of a possible increase in 
the number of severe weather rela-
ted events due to climate change, and 
growing urban populations and indus-
trialization in areas subject to high na-
tural hazard risk, governments should 
take heed in addressing the risk of Na-
techs not only to avoid natural disaster 
caused losses in industry, but also to 
avoid or reduce possible health, envi-
ronmental, and economic impacts.
A comprehensive approach to Natech 
risk governance should be adopted that 
considers Natechs as a territorial issue 
integrating structural and nonstructural 
risk reduction measures at individual fa-
cilities and across industrial areas, stren-
gthens the capacity of local communi-
ties to make their own informed Natech 
risk management choices, and promotes 
the participation of all stakeholders, in 
particular natural hazard specialists, 
disaster managers, land use planners, 
engineers, industry and professional 
associations, community groups, non-
governmental organizations (NGO) and 
municipal governments, in all stages of 
Natech risk reduction.
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